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I. INTRODUCTION
The popular conception is that the political fairness of election districts can be
measured by the degree to which an elected body reflects the partisan make-up of
its electorate.' In a similar vein, many imply the "racial fairness" of election
districts should be measured by the degree to which legislators mirror the racial and
ethnic make-up of the electorate.2 However, those who expect a rough match
between the composition of a legislative body and its electorate ask of our
geographically based representational system an outcome it simply is not designed
to deliver.3
Over the past forty-five years, and particularly since the early 1990s, concerns
about "racial faimess"-understandable though they were-have significantly
eroded sensibly constructed election districts. For example, to create greater
opportunities for the election of African Americans, once compact congressional
districts composed of entire counties have been replaced by districts that spread
willy-nilly over vast areas of southern states. These distorted districts slice up
counties and other political subdivisions, aggregating the necessary population to
satisfy one person, one vote in "units" that defy geographic description. State
legislative and local election districts have suffered similar fates. Election districts
once described in terms of easily identifiable geography (the mountain or coastal
district), now often are described in terms of their partisan makeup (the heavily
1. Under this view, a system is politically fair if Democratic Party candidates receiving forty-five
percent of the state-wide vote also secure forty-five percent of the legislative seats. Some distinguished
political scientists have made this argument. See ROBERT G. DIXON, JR., DEMOCRATIC
REPRESENTATION: REAPPORTIONMENT IN LAW AND POLITICS 15-22 (1968); see also Gaffney v.
Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973) (finding constitutional a districting plan "gerrymandered" to produce
districts that would result in a legislature mirroring the popular vote); Daniel H. Lowenstein & Jonathan
Steinberg, The Quest for Legislative Districting in the Public Interest: Elusive or Illusory?, 33 UCLA
L. REV. 1, 52-53 & nn. 129-36 (1985) (referring to popular and academic views on proportional results).
2. See QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH: THE IMPACT OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT, 1965-1990,
345 tbl. 11.1 (Chandler Davidson & Bernard Grofman eds., 1994) (containing a series of articles on the
impact of the Voting Rights Act in individual Southern states, each of which chronicles black progress
by comparing the group's percentage of the electorate to it percentage of elected bodies); Katharine I.
Butler, Constitutional and Statutory Challenges to Election Structures: Dilution and the Value of the
Right to Vote, 42 LA. L. REV. 851, 863-76 (1982) (summarizing early studies measuring black electoral
success in municipal election by the degree to which the group had achieved proportional
representation); see also National Roster of Black Elected Officials, published annually by the Joint
Center for Political & Economic Studies from 1970 to 1993) (collecting data on the election of blacks
to all levels of public office). These publications routinely include comparisons like the following:
"[B]lacks comprise 11.8 percent of the total population of the United States, [but] represent only 4.2
percent of the 7,497 state legislators in America." 10 NATIONAL ROSTER OF BLACK ELECTED OFFICIALS,
1980, at 9 (1981). See also ABIGAIL M. THERNSTROM, WHOSE VOTES COUNT?: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
AND MINORITY VOTING RIGHTS 129 (1987) (reporting comments made by Dr. Willie Gibson when he
was president of the NAACP Conference for South Carolina and by Jessie Jackson to the effect that
'blacks comprise one-third of the South Carolina's population and deserve one-third of its
representation"').
3. By "geographic representational system," I mean simply a system in which members of a
legislative body are elected from a defined geographic area and consequently represent the people living
in the area encompassed by their districts' boundaries.
[Vol. 57: 749
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Democratic district; the Republican leaning district), or their racial and ethnic
makeup (a majority Hispanic district; an African American opportunity or influence
district).
In the pages that follow, I argue that gradually, and with no input from the
public, our system of geographic representation-the system in place since our
nation's founding-has been undermined, particularly in states subject to Section
5 of the Voting Rights Act. In those states, grossly geographically distorted districts
have imposed de facto "interest group representation" for racial, ethnic, and highly
partisan elements of the electorate. The result is that many places no longer have
a "functional" geographic representational system, but neither do they have genuine
interest group representation. Possibly, we have reached the point as a nation where
too few of a voter's political interests are tied to residence for geographic
representation to remain viable. If so, however, the solution is to adopt a different
system for everyone-not to distort the existing system for all to bestow a
perceived benefit on some.
11. BIZARRE DISTRICTS CAPTURE THE ATrENTION OF THE SOMNAMBULISTIC
PUBLIC
[Redistricting] is one of those subjects that tends to cause the eyes
of wary citizens to glaze over. Learning that politicians are prone
to engage in shady deals when feathering their own nests has all
the jarring revelation of informing them that the ancient Greeks
spoke Greek. Talk to the average voter about [the techniques of
gerrymandering districts] and they will go to sleep.4
As the mystery writer Steve Martini suggested, it takes a lot to interest the
general public in the drawing of election districts. Districts are most often
constructed by those likely to benefit from that construction, overseen by others
with their own agendas, and, these days, frequently reconstructed via litigation,
where the issues likely to dominate are those raised by those same narrow
interests. Such protection as the public's interest in sensible, competitive
election districts comes-if at all-from the degree to which line drawers
follow "objective (often called traditional) districting standards."
Standards for constructing elections districts, beyond those mandated by
federal constitutional and statutory law,5 vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.
4. STEVE MARTINI, DOUBLE TAP 407 (2005). The reader interested in why this best-selling popular
fiction writer mentions redistricting in a murder mystery will simply have to read the book.
5. Since the early 1960s, the Supreme Court has held that the Fourteenth Amendment requires all
state and local legislative districts to comply with the principle of one person, one vote. See Reynolds
v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). The Court has also held that Article I, Section 2 of the Constitution
imposes a similar requirement on congressional districts. See Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
Jurisdictions subject to Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act (described infra note 9) must obtain federal
approval of their districting plans, as well as any other change in their election laws. In addition, all
districting plans are subject to challenge under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, which prohibits
3
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These standards ostensibly serve three functions. The first is to create
geographic representational units such that elements of the electorate within
those units can effectively organize for political activity-political activity
which, if necessary, can be directed against the incumbent. The second is to
increase the likelihood that districts will contain individuals who share
sufficient political interests to be effectively represented by the person elected.
The third is to limit the degree to which legislators can manipulate district
boundaries for personal and partisan purposes. Typical standards include the
following: that districts do not unnecessarily divide political subdivisions or,
when possible, follow their boundaries; that districts be compact and consist of
only contiguous territory; and, when possible and consistent with other
standards, that districts be constructed so as to respect communities of interest.
6
Legislators undoubtably have created election districts that violated these
standards in order to advance incumbent and partisan advantages for as long as
the process of assigning representatives to districts has existed. Occasionally,
they have produced districts sufficiently distorted to ignite at least the
momentary outrage of the press. The classic example was the senatorial district
included in Massachusetts' 1812 redistricting plan. When embellished by a
skilled cartoonist, the district, which resembled a salamander, was quickly
dubbed a "Gerrymander" in honor of Governor Elbridge Gerry, who signed the
redistricting bill into law.7 Despite the occasional outrageous example, districts
sufficiently distorted to generate interests outside political circles have been
relatively rare, at least historically, in relation to the total number of the
nation's election districts.
electoral arrangements that dilute the voting strength of protected minorities. See infra notes 69-71 and
accompanying text.
6. See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647 (1993). "Community of interests" is a somewhat vague
phrase. Bernard Grofman, Criteria for Districting: A Social Science Perspective, 33 UCLA L. REv. 77,
87 (1985). The term typically includes defined neighborhoods, other geographically cognizable areas,
regions sharing economic interests, and the like. Id. The requirement that districts follow natural
boundaries is another common criteria. Id. at 87-88. A few states require that the district boundaries
of the two state legislative houses be coterminous. Id. at 88, 177 tbl.3.
7. MARK MONMONIER, BUSHMANDERS & BULLWINKLES 1-2 (2001).
[Vol. 57: 749
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In the early 1990s, the public's usual malaise about the decennial
redistrictings following each census was for a short time overcome by the
significant press coverage of districts like those depicted below. Legislators
drew the contorted boundaries of these districts to make them majority African
American or majority Hispanic in response to demands by the United States
Department of Justice (DOJ) in its role as administrator of Section 5 of the
Voting Rights Act, 9 the so-called preclearance provision.
FIGURE 1.
TEXAS 30TH CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT, 1992 I0
8. The DOJ's pressure to create the districts in Georgia and Louisiana, depicted in Figure 1 and
Figure 4, was discussed by the courts in Johnson v. Miller, 864 F. Supp. 1354, 1360-69 (S.D. Ga.
1994), and Hays v. Louisiana, 839 F. Supp.1188, 1196 n.21(W.D. La. 1993), vacated and remanded
sub nom., United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737 (1995) ("[Tlhe Attorney General's Office (AGO) had
let it be known that [Section 5] preclearance would not be forthcoming for any plan that did not include
at least two 'safe' black districts out of seven."). The DOJ's conduct during the post-1990 round of
state-wide redistrictings was the subject of a book by one commentator. See MAURICE T. CUNNINGHAM,
MAXIMIZATION, WHATEVER THE COST: RACE, REDISTRICTING, AND THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 1
(2001). In the case of Texas, pressure on the legislature was more indirect-coming mainly from its
"'understanding' that minority districts would be required. Vera v. Richards, 861 F. Supp. 1304,
1324-25 (S.D. Tex. 1994), affd sub nom. Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996) (citations omitted).
9. Section 5 requires certain jurisdictions, principally the Deep South states, to obtain prior federal
approval before implementing any change in their elections law, including changes in the boundaries
of election districts. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (2000); Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526, 528-35 (1973).
Thus, in "covered jurisdictions," the redistrictings mandated by one person, one vote following each
census must be submitted for "preclearance," which in virtually all cases is sought from the United
States Attorney General. "Preclearance" determinations are made by the Assistant Attorney General
for Civil Rights, in most cases in accordance with the recommendations of the DOJ's Voting Section.
Preclearance is to be granted only if the covered jurisdiction convinces federal authorities that the
change in election law was not adopted for a racially discriminatory purpose and will not have a racially
discriminatory effect. The standards for preclearance of redistricting changes are discussed infra at
notes 62-67 and accompanying text.
10. This district inspired the following description from a federal court: "the configuration of
District 30 closely resembles a microscopic view of a new strain of disease, and has been the subject
of well-deserved national ridicule as the most gerrymandered district in the United States." Terrazas v.
Slage, 789 F. Supp. 828, 834 (W.D. Tex. 1991). Two other Texas congressional districts, Districts 18
and 29, could be similarly described. See MONMONIER, supra note 7, at 59 fig.4.4.
5
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FIGURE 2.
NORTH CAROLINA MAJORITY-MINORITY DISTRICTS, 1992
12
FIGURE 3.
GEORGIA MAJORITY-MINORITY DISTRICTS, 1992
FIGURE 4.
LOUISIANA MAJORITY-MINORITY DISTRICTS, 1992
[Vol. 57:749
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Even ordinary citizens who normally fell into somnambulism at the first
mention of redistricting questioned whether districts resembling a bug splat
(Texas's 30th Congressional District), drawn down an interstate (North
Carolina's 12th Congressional District), joining the suburbs of Atlanta with
neighborhoods in Savannah and Augusta (Georgia's 1 1th Congressional
District), or otherwise defying logic (Louisiana's 4th Congressional District)
were sensible geographic units from which to elect the people's representatives.
South Carolina's only slightly less distorted congressional districts did not
receive the national attention of those above, most of which were eventually
invalidated." Nevertheless, the state's 1992 congressional districts departed
sharply from the compact districts of the past, which, pursuant to the state
constitution, had been created out of whole counties, modified only when
necessary to comply with one person, one vote. Compare the 1992 districts
2
with those from the previous decade:
FIGURE 5.
SOUTH CAROLINA CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS, 199213
11. See the cases cited infra notes 29-30. Georgia's 5th Congressional District and Louisiana's
2nd Congressional District were not challenged. North Carolina's 1 st Congressional District was spared
because none of the challengers lived in it. See Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 904 (1996).
12. This plan was adopted by a three-judge federal court after the legislature failed to agree upon
a plan. All parties to the litigation argued that the court should include a majority-minority district,
despite a provision in the South Carolina Constitution indicating a preference that congressional districts
be made up of entire counties. See S.C. CONST. art. VII, § 13. The absence of opposition influenced the
court's decision to create the district. See Burton v. Sheheen, 793 F. Supp. 1329, 1357 (D.S.C. 1992).
13. The majority-minority 6th Congressional District is highlighted. In 2002, a federal court again
drew the state's congressional districts, this time substantially respecting county boundaries. The 2002
map is available at http://www.scstatehouse.net/man06/ 45_CongDistMap.pdf
7
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FIGURE 6.
SOUTH CAROLINA CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS, 1982
Like South Carolina, many states had, by law or tradition, respected
political subdivisions' boundaries (particularly county boundaries) when
creating congressional and state legislative districts. For example, Georgia,
with only rare exceptions, created its congressional districts out of whole
counties for as long as single-member districts were used to elect its members
of Congress. 4 The 1980 congressional districts of North Carolina, Texas, and
Louisiana were composed primarily of whole counties (or parishes in
Louisiana).15 Many states still follow this practice to the extent feasible. See,
for example, the post-2000 congressional districts of Minnesota, Ohio, West
Virginia, and Iowa. 16
III. GEOGRAPHIC REPRESENTATION AND TRADITIONAL DISTRICTING
STANDARDS: THE TRANSITION FROM DISTRICTS CLOSELY ALIGNED WITH
IDENTIFIABLE GEOGRAPHY TO DISTRICTS INCAPABLE OF GEOGRAPHIC
DESCRIPTION
While the public's interest in the bizarre districts of the 1990s waned
reasonably quickly, their creation, challenge, and eventual invalidation by the
Supreme Court led to vehement disagreements among judges, legal scholars,
14. Wesberry v. Vandiver, 206 F. Supp. 276, 280 (N.D. Ga. 1962).
15. Timothy G. O'Rourke, Shaw v. Reno: The Shape of Things to Come, 26 Rur. L.J. 723,
762-64 (1995).
16. Maps of these districts can be accessed via the Department of the Interior's National Atlas of
the United States website, located at http://www.nationalatlas.gov.
[Vol. 57: 749
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political scientists, and political geographers. 7 Ostensibly, the disagreement
was over the importance of traditional districting standards to "fair
representation." Supporters of these districts argued that creating majority-
minority districts was a higher order good than drawing geographically neat
ones.18 Judicial disagreement fell along these lines:
Judge Phillips wrote the opinion in Shaw v. Hunt,'9 one of the opinions
written in the long-running challenge to North Carolina's 1992 congressional
districts (depicted above). He posited that "compactness, contiguity, and
respect for political subdivisions have little inherent value in the districting
process. The ultimate purpose of legislative apportionment and redistricting is
to ensure 'fair and effective representation for all citizens.'
2
1
Judge Jones wrote the opinion in Vera v. Richards,2' the challenge to
Texas's bizarre congressional districts (one of which is depicted above). She
had a different view: "Traditional... districting criteria are a concomitant part
of truly 'representative' single member districting plans. 22 Judge Jones
observed that when districts violate these standards, they disrupt grassroots
political activity and ultimately undermine "It]he bedrock principle of self-
government, the interdependency of representatives and their constituents. "23
At the heart of the differing views on the value of traditional districting
standards is a disagreement about what is to be represented in a system that
elects its legislators from geographic districts. If that "what" is the collective
interests of identifiable groups, whether racial minorities or Republicans, our
geographically based system clearly fails. Our system only coincidentally
reflects broad-based political interest groups (Democrats and Republicans) and
17. See Symposium, Voting Rights After Shaw v. Reno, 26 RUTGERs L.J. 517 (1995); Symposium,
The Future of Voting Rights After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REv. 483 (1993); Conference, The
Supreme Court, Racial Politics, and the Right to Vote: Shaw v. Reno and the Future of the Voting
Rights Act, 44 AM. U. L. REv. 1 (1994).
18. See, e.g., Pamela S. Karlan, John Hart Ely and the Problem of Gerrymandering: The Lion in
Winter, 114 YALE L.J. 1329, 1343 (2005) ("[T]he deliberate creation of majority-nonwhite districts is
a central technique for combating the prejudice against discrete and insular minorities to which the third
prong of Carolene Products was addressed."); see also Conference, supra note 17 (reporting an edited
version of proceedings of the conference which had twenty participants, including law professors,
lawyers, social scientists, and politicians). I was the lone participant who agreed with the Court's
decision in Shaw that violating traditional districting standards to create majority-minority districts
caused constitutional problems. Two others expressed reservations about creating bizarre districts
(Professors Richard Pildes and Samuel Issacharoff), but most of the remaining participants, to one
degree or another, shared the view of civil rights lawyer Anita S. Hodgkiss that "the shape of the district
does not impact effective and fair representation." Id. at 46.
19. 861 F. Supp. 408 (E.D.N.C. 1994), rev'd, 517 U.S. 899 (1996).
20. Id. at 451 (quoting Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 748 (1973)). Judge Phillips noted
these standards were once thought to realize the goal of fair and effective reprerentation "because they
link together citizens who are likely to share common needs and interests, reduce the cost of
campaigning, and make it easier for legislators to maintain close contact with their constituents," but
they are no longer necessary or even appropriate today. Id.
21. 861 F. Supp. 1304 (S.D. Tex. 1994), af'd sub nom. Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996).
22. Id. at 1334 n.43.
23. Id.
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even more rarely mirrors other characteristics of the nation's electorate (race,
ethnicity, and gender) that may correlate with political interests.24
Traditional districting standards are designed to produce districts that can
be effective representational units in a system in which the legislator represents
the interests of a population living in a defined area. To be sure, not all of a
voter's representational interests correlate with the interests of those in close
proximity to him. However, interests that do not correlate with residency
logically cannot be considered when designing geographic districts. If our goals
are direct interest group representation and legislative bodies more reflective
of the partisan and racial make-up of the electorate, the solution is not "bug
splat districts" but rather a representational system specifically designed to
produce that result.
The vast majority of the world's democracies utilize representational
systems that guarantee elected bodies will mirror the popular vote. 25 These
interest-group representational systems, also know as proportional
representation systems, are organized to directly represent interest groups in
rough proportion to their strength in the electorate, regardless of where the
24. Common sense belies the proposition that proportional partisan representation is a realistic
expectation of fairly drawn geographic districts. Only the fact that political party strength is not evenly
distributed throughout a jurisdiction prevents the majority party from winning all elected offices. When
the Connecticut legislature attempted in 1971 to draw districts that would reflect the popular partisan
vote, it had to significantly ignore its own districting standards in an effort produce political equality.
See Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 737-38 (1973). Today, political scientists and other experts
are in substantial agreement that geographic districts, drawn pursuant to traditional districting standards,
will only coincidentally lead to proportional partisan outcomes. See Lowenstein & Steinberg, supra note
1, at 52-54 (referring to popular and academic views on proportional results). An expectation of racial
proportionality is similarly illogical. Assuming minority status to be a relevant basis for political views,
no more reason exists to expect geographic districts to produce "racially proportional" legislative bodies
than to expect other arguably politically relevant demographic characteristics to be proportionally
represented. A better argument is that residential patterns, often the product of past discrimination, have
produced geographic concentrations of minority voters such that some number of "standard" districts
will naturally contain a majority of minority citizens. However, it is highly unlikely that standard
districts, created without substantial racial manipulation, will result in a proportional number of such
districts. Professor Richard H. Pildes expressed the problem nicely when he noted,
to evaluate territorial districting systems in terms of whether they produce
proportional representation is, in a sense, to fail to understand the basic idea
behind the very system .... [a problem in the voting rights area] now is that we
are trying to wedge into this territorial districting systems concerns for
proportional representation or fair representation of various interests, and the
system is being stretched to the breaking point because it simply isn't designed
to accommodate that.
Conference, supra note 17, at 84.
25. See MONMONiER, supra note 7, at 144-46; Grofman, supra note 6, at 161-62. See also Lani
Guinier, Supreme Democracy: Bush v. Gore Redux, 34 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 23, 60 (2002) (noting that




South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 57, Iss. 4 [2006], Art. 6
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol57/iss4/6
2006] RACIAL FAIRNESS AND TRADITIONAL DISTRICTING STANDARDS 759
group members live.26 If South Carolina had such a system, its African
American citizens, if they voted cohesively for a political party organized to
represent their interests, could expect to elect a portion of the legislature
roughly equal to their portion of the total votes cast. Similarly, any interest
group-be it a broad-based political party or one more narrowly focused, such
as opponents of abortion-could do the same so long as the group had
sufficient electoral support to qualify for a legislative seat.
Obviously, South Carolina and other states, as well as almost all lesser
political subdivisions, do not have electoral systems designed for direct interest
group representation.2' Rather, legislators elected from geographic districts are
expected to represent all the people of their district-including those not
qualified to vote and those who voted for someone else.
Reasonable people can disagree as to what makes a sensible geographic
district-particularly from the perspective of effective representation of the
citizens residing therein. I suspect that most academics, as well as others with
vested interests in the political consequences of the infamous districts of the
1990s, genuinely agree with Judge Phillips-the content of a district is a better
indication of whether it is sensible than the contours of its boundaries.28
Superficially, their position is unassailable. For example, African Americans
in the northern tip of North Carolina's interstate district almost certainly
viewed themselves as having more political interests in common with African
Americans in the district's southern tip than with white residents of their
county. It may also be true, however, that whites in the district did not feel any
obvious political kinship with either its African American beneficiaries or with
its other whites-"filler population" added to the district to satisfy one person,
one vote. Moreover, if a district's effectiveness is to be measured by its
population content, divorced from the contours of its geography, how can it be
26. Numerous variations exist in the operations of various proportional representational systems,
but their common objective is a legislative body in which political parties are represented in accordance
with their proportional share of the vote. Grofman, supra note 6, at 161-62. Systems providing some
degree of, but less than full proportionality, are often identified as "semiproportional systems." Id. at
161. The details of these systems are beyond the scope of this article. See generally DOUGLAS W. RAE,
THE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF ELECTORAL LAWS (revised ed. 1964) (discussing the relationship
between political parties and election laws).
27. One exception was Illinois, which from 1870 to 1980 elected its lower legislative chamber
using "cumulative voting," a semiproportional electoral scheme. Grofman, supra note 6, at 162-63. In
a cumulative voting system, voters are permitted to cast multiple votes for fewer than all of the offices
up for election. Id. at 163. A relatively small number of local governments, counties, municipalities, and
school boards have at times used either cumulative voting or "limited voting," another type of
semiproportional system in which voters are limited to casting fewer votes than there are offices up for
election. Id. at 161-70. Occasionally, local governments have adopted one or the other of these systems
to settle Section 2 litigation. Laughlin McDonald, The 1982 Amendments of Section 2 and Minority
Representation, in CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY VOTING, THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT IN PERSPECTIVE
66, 83-84 (Bernard Grofman & Chandler Davidson eds., 1992) [hereinafter CONTROVERSIES IN
MINORITY VOTING] (adopting either limited or cumulative voting in twenty-seven local jurisdictions
in Alabama).
28. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
11
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fair to create districts for political groups that can be identified from census
data (such as minorities) or from data that can be tied to census geography
(such as precinct level political data) but not for other political interest groups
whose members cannot be identified sufficiently to be placed in a district?
While the public-at-large may not .have delved deeply into these issues, the
average individual likely has little difficulty seeing districts drawn down
interstates and resembling bug splats as not sensible-no matter why they were
created.
In a series of cases starting with Shaw v. Reno,29 the Supreme Court
concluded North Carolina's 12th Congressional District, Georgia's 2nd and
1 1th Congressional Districts, and Texas's 18th, 29th, and 30th Congressional
Districts were not required by the Voting Rights Act and, furthermore, were
unconstitutional as racial gerrymanders.3" However, believing the Supreme
Court's rejection of the state's underlying premise for creating these distortions
either mandated or resulted in a return to more "standard" districts would be a
gross misperception. As the matters discussed below unfolded, a number of
factors, including the basis of the Court's ruling and dicta in its opinions,
encouraged even greater abandonment of traditional districting standards.
How did we go from districts consisting of geographically recognizable
areas to districts resembling bug splats? Much of the credit for the most
extreme distortion goes to Section 531 and, to a lesser extent, Section 232 of the
Voting Rights Act. However, several factors played supporting roles: the
Supreme Court's insistence on fairly strict population equality across
districts-the so-called one-person, one-vote principle; the Census Bureau's
decision in 1990 to provide very location-specific population information,
coupled with computer technology sufficient to draw districts no wider than a
city block; and finally, legislators' acceptance of the Court's backhanded
invitation to gerrymander for any reason except a racial one. I will sketch out
these factors and their contribution to the decline of traditional districting
standards.
29. 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
30. The remaining cases, hereinafter collectively referred to as "Shaw progeny" were (I)
challenges to North Carolina's congressional districts: Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996), Hunt v.
Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541 (1999), and Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234 (2001); (2) a challenge to
Georgia's congressional districts: Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995); and (3) a challenge to
Texas's congressional districts: Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996). The Court dismissed the challenge
to Louisiana's districts for lack of standing. United States v. Hayes, 515 U.S. 737, 747 (1995). However,
new plaintiffs quickly challenged a different and almost as non-sensible district, which the district court
declared unconstitutional. See Hays v. Louisiana, 936 F. Supp. 360, 371 (W.D. La. 1996).
31. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (2000).
32. Id. § 1973.
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A. One Person, One Vote
Before Baker v. Carr3 3-and here I paint with a very broad
brush-representatives in many, perhaps most, state legislative bodies were
"apportioned" (allocated) to fixed geographic units-typically counties or other
political subdivisions.34 Often population was loosely taken into account in the
apportioning process for one or both legislative bodies by assigning more
representatives to heavily populated counties. One common apportionment
scheme was the so-called "little federal model." In South Carolina's version,
each county, regardless of population, was assigned one senator35 while seats
in the house were assigned to counties on the basis of population.36 Although
there were other variations in how the states used political subdivisions for
assigning representatives, political subdivisions played major roles in
determining boundaries in almost all states-either directly as actual "units" of
representation or as their building blocks.37
The reapportionment cases of the early 1960s invalidated any scheme that
assigned legislative representatives without regard to population of the
represented unit and prescribed strict population equality requirements for
districts. After Reynolds v. Sims3" and Wesberry v. Sanders,3 9 the legislative and
congressional representational schemes in virtually every state needed major
adjustments.4"
While the Court recognized some deviation from population equality would
be permitted to maintain the integrity of political subdivisions, the degree of
33. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
34. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 608-610 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (detailing the
provisions of various states from ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment forward). Justice
Frankfurter's dissent in Baker referenced various state provisions with apportionment not based on
population. Baker, 369 U.S. at 311-24 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
35. S.C. CONST. art. Im, § 6.
36. Id. § 3.
37. See ROBERT B. McKAY, REAPPORTIONMENT: THE LAW AND POLITICS OF EQUAL
REPRESENTATION app. at 275-458 (1965) (summarizing the original, revised, 1962, and 1965 formulas
for apportioning each state's upper and lower legislative chambers).
38. 377 U.S. 533, 561-68, 577 (1964) (setting out the parameters of the Court's one-person, one-
vote mandate and holding the Fourteenth Amendment required population to be the basis for assigning
representatives for both houses of a bicameral legislative body while recognizing legitimate state
interests may justify slight deviations from absolute equality in the ratio of representatives to
population).
39. 376 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1964) (holding malapportioned congressional districts violated the command
of Article I, Section 2 that representatives be chosen "'by the People of the several States' (quoting
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1)). The Court eventually would hold only "unavoidable" deviations from
population equality would be permitted with respect to congressional districts. Kirkpatrick v. Preisler,
394 U.S. 526, 530-31 (1969).
40. See DIXON, supra note 1, app. A at 589 ("[S]how[ing] the apportionment position of the states
as of January 1962 on the eve of Baker v. Carr, and at successive periods until a 'final' reapportionment
was achieved"); MCKAY, supra note 37, app. at 275-458 (summarizing the original, revised, 1962, and
1965 formulas for apportioning each state's upper and lower legislative chambers).
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permissible deviation was relatively small.4 The vast differences typical in
populations of a state's counties made their retention as individual units of
representation for either house of a bicameral legislature impractical,
effectively eliminating the little federal system. For example, assigning one
legislative representative to the least populous county in South Carolina in
1960, McCormick County (population 8,629),42 would have required the
legislative body involved to have a total of 276 members.43
Moreover, to continue to use whole counties as the building blocks of
districts, legislators had to make significant use of multimember districts44 and
sometimes floterial districts.4 5  Even when these devices were available to
retain some semblance of county-based representation, the resulting districts
were hardly the equivalent of the permanent geographic representational units
of the past.46 Prior to the Court's reapportionment cases, in many states,
adjustments were made for population changes by revising the number of
41. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 578-79. The Court has not specifically set an outer limit for the
deviation from population equality in state legislative districts that can be justified by a legitimate state
interest. It found a deviation of 16.4 percent to be justified in Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 319, 333
(1973), but found a deviation of 19.3 percent unacceptable in Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 418
(1977). A deviation of less than ten percent is prima facie valid in legislative plans. Connor, 431 U.S.
at 418. The total deviation in a districting scheme is determined by adding together the absolute
deviation of the most over-populated and most under-populated districts. For example, in a town of
1,000 with ten single-member districts, an ideal district would contain 100 people. If the most populous
district contains 105 (a +5 percent deviation) and the least populous contains 95 (a -5 percent deviation),
the total deviation would be 10 percent.
42. SOUTH CAROLINA: POPULATION OF COUNTIES BY DECENNIAL CENSUS: 1900 TO 1990 (1995),
http://www.census.gov/population/cencounts/sc 190090.txt [hereinafter S.C. POPULATION].
43. South Carolina's 1960 population of 2,382,594 divided by the population supporting one
representative for McCormick (8,629) equals 276. Id. The South Carolina Constitution provides for one
senator per county, which by 1960 numbered forty-six, and for 124 house members. S.C. CONST. art.
IEI, § 6.
44. A multimember district is one from which more than one legislative representative is elected.
45. A floterial district is one "that includes several separate districts or political subdivisions that
independently would not be entitled to additional representation, but whose conglomerate population
entitles the district to another seat in the legislative body being apportioned." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 510 (8th ed. 2004). For example, District A, electing one representative, is combined with
District B, electing two representatives, to form District C (a floterial district), electing one
representative.
46. South Carolina's response to Reynolds v. Sims was typical of states that had previously used
the little federal system or had otherwise used counties as districts. The ideal district size for a senate
district based on the state's 1960 population was 51,796, calculated by dividing the total state
population of 2,383,594 by forty-six, the number of senators. 1970 SOUTH CAROLINA LEGISLATIVE
MANUAL 13 (Inez Watson ed., 1970). To avoid cutting county lines, the legislature adopted a plan for
the state senate that was comprised of a mixture of miltimember and single member districts and, when
necessary, combined two or more whole counties to form a district. See id. at 14-15. For example,
Richland County (population 200,102) was a multimember district, assigned four senators, all elected
by the county as a whole. Id. Darlington County (52,928) had a single senator and thus was a single
member district. Id. Allendale, Bamberg, and Barnwell Counties (combined populations 45,295) were
combined to form a single member district. See id. The legislature adopted this plan in 1967 after earlier
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representatives assigned to each district following a new census. In other
words, the represented unit remained the same, but the number of
representatives assigned to each unit changed with population shifts between
censuses.
47
After Reynolds, the required degree of population equality frequently meant
the particular combination of counties included in a district had to be revised
after each census. In addition to these practical problems, political and
sometimes legal issues associated with multimember districts led to a decline
in their use and almost certainly a near elimination of the practice of
apportioning representatives to counties.48 Without multimember districts, the
use of whole counties as the primary building blocks for state legislative
districts was also more difficult. Eventually, respect for political subdivision
boundaries thus became just one permissible factor to be considered when
creating equally populated districts.
If political subdivisions with fixed boundaries were no longer available as
representational units, then adjustments to comply with the one-person, one-
vote principle would instead be made by changing the boundaries of
districts-"redistricting" thus replaced "reapportionment" as the means to take
population changes into account in assigning representatives. Standards other
than political subdivision boundaries that served to encourage sensible districts
and discourage gerrymandering-compactness, contiguity, and respect for
communities of interest-were less objective and thus more subject to
47. As any student of politics or constitutional law knows, before Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186
(1962), state legislators routinely ignored the provisions of their own constitutions requiring periodic
reapportionment of their legislative seats for the body or bodies for which population was a factor. See
Grofman, supra note 6, at 79-80. As a result, by the 1960s gross disparities existed in the
representative-to-population ratio between urban and rural areas. In Tennessee (the state involved in
Baker), for example, one representative district had only 2,340 voters and another had 42,298; each
elected a single representative, despite a provision in the Tennessee constitution requiring both
legislative bodies to be apportioned to counties or districts on the basis of qualified voters. DIXON,
supra note 1, at 120. Note, however, that had Tennessee followed its constitution, its apportionment
plan would nevertheless have been unconstitutional under Reynolds, as "qualified voters" (the state's
basis for apportionment) was not an acceptable substitute for actual population.
48. Large multimember districts often submerged political and racial elements of the electorate
perhaps could have elected their "own" candidates from single member districts. If the electorate was
fairly balanced between the two major parties, each might have preferred single member districts that
assured it of some representation, rather than risk losing every seat in an at-large election. Submergence
of politically cohesive minority groups in multimember districts is a common basis for a racial vote
dilution suit. See, e.g., Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986) ("The Court has long recognized that
multimember districts may 'operate to minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial [minorities
in] the voting population."' (quoting Bums v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 88 (1966) (alterations in
original)); White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 765 (1973) ("[Wle have entertained claims that
multimember districts are being used invidiously to cancel out or minimize the voting strength of racial
groups."). Professor Grofman observed in 1985 that the number of multimember districts had been
declining for two decades and that multimember districts had been virtually eliminated in Section 5
jurisdictions. Grofman, supra note 6, at 78-79 n.7.
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manipulation.49 When no longer constrained by matching districts to existing
political subdivisions, legislators no doubt found it easier to justify district
boundaries that had no independent significance for the voter.
Still, in most states, traditional districting standards, including respect for
political subdivisions, limited outrageous gerrymandering of the sort that would
be seen in the 1990s. Even when districting standards lacked the force of law,
a number of practical and political considerations encouraged compliance.
First, the standards in place were somewhat self-perpetuating in that
incumbents generally liked the districts that elected them. Second, obvious and
unnecessary deviations from the standards likely drew unpopular media
attention and with it a potential political backlash.
Legislators, who were accustomed to "standard" districts and even to
advancing personal and partisan interests without seriously deviating from
traditional districting standards, had few reasons to draw districts that ran down
interstate highways or that otherwise totally departed from the districts that had
elected them. 50 Thus, while Reynolds v. Sims 5 effectively eliminated the use of
"fixed" election districts and lessened reliance of political subdivision
boundaries, other objective standards tended to produce acceptable geographic
districts. As noted earlier, the 1980 congressional districts of all the states
whose bizarre districts appear in Part II were comprised primarily of whole
52counties. There can be little doubt that outside forces in 1990 compelled these
states' legislators to deviate so drastically from past practices and adopt
districts that awakened at least the temporary interest of the general public.
49. Respect for political subdivision lines remained an important districting criterion and, because
these boundaries were fixed, was the most objective. "Compactness," "contiguity," and "communities
of interests" lacked firm definitions and were not as effective in constraining gerrymandering. A
summary of state districting standards, as of 1981, can be found in Grofman, supra note 6, at 177-83
tbl.3.
50. Legislators who followed traditional districting standards did not necessarily refrain from
manipulating district boundaries for their personal and partisan advantage. Districting standards were
sufficiently flexible that the majority party could minimize the minority party's electoral opportunities
without creating the grossly distorted districts appearing in the 1990s. Partisan gerrymandering and
measures to contain it have been recurring topics for academics and commentators for as long as
elections have been held by districts. See Symposium, Gerrymandering and the Courts, 33 UCLA L.
REv. 1 (1985). A new round of articles was spawned by the Court's 2004 decision in Vieth v. Jubelirer,
541 U.S. 267 (2004). At the time of this writing, a search of the Westlaw database for law reviews and
journals using the case name and gerrymandering produced eighty-four hits. See, e.g., Symposium,
Electoral Redistricting and the Supreme Court, 14 CORNELL L.J. & PUB. POL'Y 367 (2005) (discussing
partisan gerrymandering and related Supreme Court jurisprudence); Developments in the Law-Voting
and Democracy, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (2006) (summarizing recent developments in election law). The
bizarre districts of the 1990s, however, had far more serious consequences for geographically based
representation than the gerrymanders of old, which were less disruptive of grassroots political
organizations in their electoral consequences. See Richard H. Pildes, Principled Limitations on Racial
and Partisan Redistricting, 106 YALE L.J. 2505, 2512-18 (1997) (discussing his findings that districts
after 1990 were far more distorted than districts of prior years).
51. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
52. See O'Rourke, supra note 15, at 762-64.
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B. The Voting Rights Act
In jurisdictions subject to Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act (so-called
"covered jurisdictions"), coercion came from the DOJ, which insisted on
additional majority-minority districts. These districts often could only be
created by ignoring traditional districting standards. Section 2 was a major
force in all jurisdictions that had a significant concentration of minority voters.
As will be seen, the DOJ was not the only culprit. Republicans cynically aided
the DOJ in its insistence on majority-minority districts. And when Democrats
controlled the redistricting process, they responded to the chaos which
abandoning traditional districting standards to create minority districts had
wreaked upon their own districts by further gerrymandering.
Congress adopted the Voting Rights Act in 1965 on the heels of the Court's
one-person, one-vote decisions.53 Fairly quickly, the Act substantially
accomplished its overriding purpose to end massive disfranchisement of
African Americans in the South. 54 When ballot access did not produce the
benefits for blacks that were expected to flow from enfranchisement, there was
an understandable sentiment that additional steps should be taken to provide
blacks "as blacks" with more direct influence over lawmakers. Help would
soon be found in Section 5 (the so-called "preclearance provision," which
required certain jurisdictions, primarily in the South, to obtain prior federal
approval before enacting changes in their elections laws) and later in Section
2 (a provision of general application). Some of the Supreme Court's early
Section 5 cases55 implied that "fair" districts for minorities would be measured
by whether they resulted in racial proportional representation-a concept at
odds with geographic representation.
In 1971, the Court in Whitcomb v. Chavis rejected the position voting rights
advocates had hoped for-a constitutional right to proportional representation
for a cognizable racial minority group.56 However, the Court recognized that
racial vote dilution could be established upon evidence that the political
processes leading to the nomination and election were not equally open to the
group, resulting in its members having less opportunity than others in the
53. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 237 (1962), decided in 1962, held that malapportioned districts
might present a constitutional problem. But the reapportionment cases, Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533
(1964), and its companion cases, decided June 1964, set the standards for population equality across
districts and thus started the reapportionment revolution. The Voting Rights Act was signed into law
in August 1965. See Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437.
54. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966) (upholding the constitutionality of
the Act and detailing the dire circumstances that led to its passage).
55. See City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S. 358, 378 (1975) (implying that fairly drawn
districts were ones which provided minorities with rough proportional representation); Perkins v.
Matthews, 400 U.S. 379, 388 (1971) (implying that minority voting rights might be seen as diluted if
their votes did not translate into proportional representation); Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S.
544, 569 (1969) (similar implication).
56. Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 149 (1971).
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electorate to elect candidates of their choice.57 Two years later, Whitcomb's
dictum became the holding in White v. Regester,5 8 thus providing a
constitutional basis for a claim of racial vote dilution.59 In combination with
dicta from the early Section 5 cases, these cases seemingly implied that Section
5 preclearance of a districting change would be granted only if the district
provided minorities with proportional representation-at least to the extent
feasible using single member districts constructed in accordance with race-
neutral districting principles.6 °
Perhaps encouraged by these cases, the DOJ insisted that covered
jurisdictions make progress toward proportional representation to obtain
preclearance of their post-1970 census redistricting plans.6' However, much to
the surprise of almost everyone, when the Supreme Court actually confronted
the issue of when new election districts would be entitled to preclearance, it
provided a very different standard.
In Beer v. United States,62 a case involving redistricting of New Orleans'
city election districts, the Court held a new districting plan had a discriminatory
effect within the meaning of Section 5 only if it resulted in retrogression of the
minority group's ability to participate in the political process relative to the
districting plan it replaced. 63 A plan that improved the group's opportunity to
elect candidates of its choice was entitled to preclearance, even if the plan as
a whole remained discriminatory. In the case of New Orleans, the Court
concluded the plan was "ameliorative" in that none of the districts in the prior
plan were majority black, whereas the city's new plan had one district with a
majority black population and another district in which blacks were also a
majority of the voters.64
Given Beer's facts and the Court's conclusion that the new plan was not
retrogressive, the most logical interpretation of the case was that a covered
jurisdiction could not adopt a redistricting plan with fewer majority-minority
districts than its prior plan, but neither was the covered jurisdiction required to
57. Id.
58. 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
59. Id. at 759.
60. Given that past discrimination and present racism could be presumed to exist in jurisdictions
subject to Section 5, the implication was that minorities were entitled to some number of "majority-
minority" single member districts to overcome the inability of candidates favored by the group to garner
white support. Racially segregated housing meant that in areas with substantial black populations,
simply drawing "standard" single member districts would inevitably result in some number of those
districts containing African Amercian majorities.
61. Early on, it is likely that the DOJ pushed only for the adoption of standard majority-minority
districts-meaning districts that could be created with modest deviations from the state's race-neutral
traditional districting standards or by elevating one standard over another-by, for example, elevating
consideration of communities of interest over respect for political subdivision boundaries.
62. 425 U.S. 130 (1976).
63. Id. at 141.
64. Id. at 141-42.
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create additional ones. 5 Maintaining the existing number of minority districts,
without more, would have required most jurisdictions to deviate at times from
their traditional districting standards simply because normal population shifts
among districts from one census to the next make it difficult to both satisfy one
person, one vote and avoid decreasing the number of minority districts.
66
However, any natural impact the retrogression standard might have had on
traditional districting standards would be difficult to evaluate because the DOJ
never limited its objections to those permitted by Beer. Despite Beer's explicit
standard, the Justices continued to require covered jurisdictions to create
majority-minority districts beyond those needed to avoid retrogression, even
in situations indistinguishable from Beer. Covered jurisdictions almost never
challenged the DOJ's objections. 67 Rather, legislators created the number of
minority districts necessary to satisfy the DOJ and then adjusted other district
lines to preserve incumbents to the extent possible.68 Traditional districting
standards again suffered. Once a minority district became part of a covered
jurisdiction's districting plan, its elimination in the next round of redistricting
would be "retrogressive."
65. While the Court spoke of retrogression in the ability of members of a minority group to
exercise their elective franchise, the only evidence of that ability the Court discussed in Beer was the
number of majority-minority districts. For a discussion of the other possible meaning of retrogression
in the context of a districting change, see Katharine Inglis Butler, Redistricting in a Post-Shaw Era: A
Small Treatise Accompanied by Districting Guidelines for Legislators, Litigants, and Courts, 36 U.
RICH. L. REV. 137, 176-91 (2002).
66. The new census population figures in the existing districts determined the existing number
of majority-minority districts. See, e.g., Georgia v. Ashcroft, 195 F. Supp. 2d 25, 42-71 (D.D.C. 2002)
(setting out the number of majority black districts in the benchmark plans at issue in this Section 5
preclearance action). For example, assume that at the time of its creation the prior districting plan had
one majority black district made up of a heavily black county, County A. Now assume that by the time
of the next census enough of County A's black population have moved into adjoining County B to make
that district also majority black. For retrogression purposes, the benchmark thus would be two majority
black districts. Not uncommonly, one or both of districts in a scenario like this would be significantly
under-populated in one-person, one-vote terms. To adjust boundaries of these two districts to add
population to satisfy one person, one vote and simultaneously maintain a black majority would
potentially require ignoring traditional districting standards. In this realistic hypothetical, the legislators
would likely ignore its standard of respecting county boundaries. In the prior plan, each county
dominated one of the districts. To maintain both districts as majority black, the first step probably would
be to put the white parts of both counties into one district and the black parts into another and then make
up the remaining population deficit from nearby counties. To be sure, the state did not have to maintain
the specific majority black districts. It merely had to maintain the number of such districts. Nevertheless,
in many instances using the black population concentrations in the actual majority black districts was
likely to present the best opportunity to avoid retrogression.
67. Beer was decided in 1976. Thereafter, the Supreme Court decided a number of Section 5 cases
involving the preclearance standard in contexts other than redistricting. However, the Court would not
hear another appeal of a case involving the DOJ's denial of preclearance to a redistricting scheme until
2003, when it decided Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461 (2003).
68. The Shaw line of cases provides examples of jurisdictions that acquiesced to the DOJ's
demands for minority districts that were not necessary to avoid retrogression. For examples from an
earlier era, see Katharine Inglis Butler, Reapportionment, the Courts, and the Voting Rights Act: A
Resegregation of the Political Process?, 56 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 28-32 (1984).
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In 1982, Congress amended Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act to serve as
a substitute for White v. Regester's constitutional racial vote dilution claim,
which had been crippled by the Court's holding in City of Mobile v. Bolden.69
After the amendment and, particularly, after its interpretation by the Court in
Thornburg v. Gingles,7 ° there was a widespread belief that Section 2 required
legislative bodies to be elected from single-member districts that, to the extent
possible, were drawn to provide a proportional number of minority districts.
Thus, in response to actual or threatened litigation or simply in response to
minority voters' demands for legislators directly accountable to them, states
with multimember districts and local governments with at-large elections
switched to single-member districts.7 To produce a sufficient number of
majority-minority districts while preserving the electoral opportunities of
incumbents, traditional districting standards often had to be ignored.
Meanwhile, Section 2's amendment provided the DOJ with another basis
to demand additional minority districts before it would grant preclearance. The
DOJ took the position that a new districting plan could be denied preclearance,
even if not retrogressive, if the plan resulted in a clear violation of Section 2.72
The Supreme Court eventually disagreed, affirming "that preclearance under
§ 5 may not be denied" based on the violation of Section 2 alone, but the ruling
came fifteen years after the provisions had given the DOJ new coercive
powers.7 3
Thus, during the 1980s, many new, all single-member district electoral
systems came into existence, almost all of which would have had some number
of majority-minority districts. Inevitably, either these districts themselves
deviated from traditional districting standards, or deviations were necessary to
simultaneously create them and protect incumbents. In Section 5 jurisdictions,
the minority districts under Beer had to be preserved in the post-1990
redistrictings. In non-Section 5 jurisdictions, ordinary political pressures tended
69. 446 U.S. 55, 70 (1980) (holding minority vote dilution was unconstitutional only if the
challenged electoral system had been adopted or maintained for a discriminatory purpose).
70. 478 U.S. 30 (1986). Amended Section 2 prohibits election practices that result in a denial of
the right to vote on account of race, with a violation established if, based on the totality of
circumstances, the challengers demonstrate the political process is not equally open to participation by
minorities, in that they have less opportunity than others "to participate in the political process and to
elect representatives of their choice." 42 U.S. C. § 1973 (2000).
71. Chandler Davidson, The Voting Rights Act: A Brief History, in CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY
VOTING, supra note 27, at 7, 74. Chandler Davidson noted that many Section 2 cases settle before trial,
and still other jurisdictions change to single member districts to avoid the threat of litigation. Id. at 47.
In Section 5 jurisdictions, changes to single member districts had to be submitted for preclearance. In
the three years before the amendments to Section 2, fewer than six-hundred Section 5 jurisdictions
submitted changes in their method of election. McDonald, supra note 27, at 71 (citation omitted). In
the three years after 1982, the number more than doubled to 1,354. Id.
72. See 28 C.F.R § 51.55(b)(2) (1996). This provision was amended in 1998, eliminating a "clear
violation of Section 2" as a basis to deny preclearance. 28 C.F.R. § 51.54 (2001).
73. Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 520 U.S. 471, 483-85 (1997).
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to preserve minority districts. In both circumstances, additional deviation from
traditional districting standards would be necessary.
Given the absence of push-back to its policy of insisting that covered
jurisdictions adopt minority districts beyond those required by non-
retrogression, the DOJ had little reason to change its position in the 1990s.
Moreover, the DOJ now had new tools by which to create minority districts
where none could have been found before. Similarly, minority groups,
emboldened by their success in the 1980s looked for additional seats now
available through improved means to identify pockets of minority voters.
Partisan politics cannot be blamed for initially causing bizarre districts but was
certainly responsible for making them worse and for failing to return to
traditional districting standards after Shaw.
C. Assistance from the Census Bureau
Efforts in the 1960s through the 1980s to increase the number of minority
districts were hampered by the available census data. Before 1990, outside of
metropolitan areas, the Census Bureau reported the population only for areas
known as enumeration districts (ED).74 Population information could be
obtained for "sub-enumeration" areas only by special request and at some
expense. It was not possible to determine from the census where within an ED
the reported population was located. So, for example, if the census reported that
a particular ED contained one-thousand people, four-hundred of whom were
black, the black population could not be "separated out" for inclusion in a
district. In 1990, the Bureau exponentially increased the number of small
geographic areas for which it routinely published population information. For
the 1990 census, the Bureau reported population for every closed polygon in
America.75 Thus, the one-thousand persons reported in our hypothetical ED in
1980 would be reported, with racial identification, block-by-block in 1990.
With computer technology available in the early 1990s and precise population
to geography data now easily accessible, it was possible for an ordinary
legislator to sit at her computer and draw her own dream district, connecting
her faithful constituents, if necessary, by strips of geography no wider than the
right of way of the interstate.
74. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T. OF COMMERCE, 1990 CENSUS OF POPULATION AND
HOUSING GUIDE, PART A. TExT, at 59, available at http://www.census.gov/prod/cen1990/cph-r/
cph-r-la.pdf. In prior censuses, population information was provided for smaller geographic units in
densely populated areas.
75. Id. In 1980, the census provided data for 2.5 million small areas. In 1990, the number was
seven million. Id.
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D. Republicans and Minorities-A Coalition of Convenience
Minority groups quickly took advantage of the new technology to argue for
the creation of additional majority-minority districts. Their efforts were aided
not only by the DOJ, which had signaled its intentions to push for additional
districts, 76 but also by Republicans. As early as the 1960s, Republican
strategists recognized that their Party benefitted from majority black districts
because their creation produced more districts that were overwhelmingly
white.77 The Republican National Committee became aggressively involved in
the 1990 round of redistrictings, joining minority legislators and leaders in
convincing the press and lawmakers in the South that the Voting Rights Act
required them to create every majority-minority district possible.78 White
Democrats understood the impact of removing minority voters (the party's most
loyal supporters) from their districts on their political futures, but politically
they could not object. When they controlled the process, Democrats agreed to
create additional minority districts and gerrymandered even more in an effort
to hold on to their own seats.79
76. See CUNNINGHAM, supra note 8, at 104.
77. Id. at 104-05.
78. Id. at 105; see also Adam Perman, GOP, Minorities Find Common Ground on House
Redistricting, BOSTON GLOBE, May 26, 1992, at NI (reporting GOP leaders "seized on the recent
changes to the Voting Rights Act" which in their view "mandate[s] that, whenever possible, minorities
had to be pulled into districts where they would compose a majority"); Jack Quinn et al., Redrawing
Political Maps: An America of Groups?, WASH. POST, Mar. 24, 1991, at Cl (reporting GOP support
for the Voting Rights Act because "the Republican hope is to product largely minority districts
surrounded by largely white districts, with a net gain for the GOP. Since minority voters tend to be
Democratic, concentrating them into one district would water down Democratic strength in adjacent
districts-thus trading one new minority (and Democratic) district for two or more new white districts
that might be more likely to vote Republican"); Abigail M. Thernstrom, A Republican-Civil Rights
Conspiracy: Working Together on Legislative Redistricting, WASH. POST, Sept. 23, 1991, at A ll ('The
Republican Party welcomes radical racial gerrymandering; minority voters concentrated in minority
districts further 'whitens' districts that are already majority-white, and overwhelmingly white districts
are just what Republican candidates like.").
79. Preserving Democratic incumbents clearly added significantly to the distortions in the Texas
districts. The lower court found that there were other more standard options for creating majority, or
near majority, black and Hispanic congressional districts, but these alternatives had been rejected
because they would have endangered the reelection chances of a few Democratic incumbents. The
challenged districts thus were the product of mixed motives-creating minority districts while
preserving non-minority incumbents. In each district, however, the Supreme Court affirmed the finding
of the lower court that racial concerns predominated. "The record discloses intensive and pervasive use
of race both as a proxy to protect the political fortunes of adjacent incumbents, and for its own sake in
maximizing the minority population of District 30 regardless of traditional districting principles." Bush
v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 972-73 (1996). The Court reached similar conclusions about the other two
districts (whose boundaries were intertwined like a jigsaw puzzle)-incumbency concerns "were
overwhelmed in the determination of the districts' bizarre shapes by the State's efforts to maximize
racial divisions." Id. at 975; see also CUNNINGHAM, supra note 8, at 106-07 (detailing the Democratic-
dominated legislature's plan for the 12th Congressional District in North Carolina) ; John Hart Ely,
Gerrymanders: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly, 50 STAN. L. REV. 607, 619 (1998) ("[T]he most
bizarre district shapes are seldom caused simply by a desire to create majority-minority districts... the
zaniness results from a tortured interaction of ethnic and more directly political concerns-that is, from
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To the extent that DOJ offered a legal justification for requiring districts
for Section 5 preclearance beyond those necessary to avoid retrogression, they
pointed to Section 2's incorporation into Section 5.80 In jurisdictions not
covered by Section 5, advocates for additional minority districts also relied on
Section 2. Seemingly, the Section 2 argument should only have been available
to those groups that were "sufficiently large and geographically compact" to
take advantage of a single member district-a prerequisite to a successful
Section 2 claim as the Supreme Court said in Thornburg v. Gingles.8 , However,
the compactness part of the requirement was routinely ignored by the DOJ, by
parties eager to settle Section 2 suits without litigation, and by legislators eager
to create minority districts at all costs. So long as neither traditional districting
standards in general nor compactness in particular mattered, the new census
data and technology removed all impediments to stringing together pockets of
minority population to create districts, such as those that appear in Part I.
E. Courts Add Their Own Bizarre Districts
Some federal courts proved to be equally eager to go along with creating
minority districts "to satisfy Section 2," hardly giving even lip service to the
Gingles' compactness requirement. In 1991, a federal court in Illinois, 82 with
the approval of all parties to the litigation, adopted the district depicted below
in order to provide a Hispanic congressional district in the Chicago area. The
court itself described the district as resembling a "Rorschach blot turned on its
side" and necessarily conceded that some of the well-known gerrymanders of
the past looked acceptable by comparison." Like the districts pictured in Part
the process of creating a district calculated both to elect a minority and at the same time to control the
damage to the Democrats."); O'Rourke, supra note 15, at 756-58 (detailing oddities in the Texas and
North Carolina districts produced by efforts to protect Democratic incumbents).
80. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 8, at 76. Often the DOJ also argued that the failure to create
additional minority districts was the product of a discriminatory purpose, to wit, to prevent the election
of additional minorities. Id. at 77-78.
81. 478 U.S. 30, 50-51 (1986).
82. Hastert v. State Bd. of Elections, 777 F. Supp. 634 (N.D. I11. 1991).
83. Id. at 648 n.24. The court noted that "'uncouth"' and 'irregular"' were terms the court used
to describe the well-known racial gerrymander. Id. (quoting Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339,
340-41 (1960)). The Court then described the proposed district as follows:
The Chicago Hispanic community resides principally in two dense enclaves, one
on Chicago's near northwest side and one on the near southwest side [separated
by the 7th congressional district]. ... [The proposed] plans connect the northwest
and southwest side Hispanic enclaves by running a narrow corridor around the
western end of the 7th Congressional District, creating a C-shaped configuration.
To ensure a sufficient Hispanic concentration within the proposed district, both
maps shoot rays out from the northwest and southwest enclaves to capture
additional Hispanic population. In sum, the district looks not unlike a Rorschach
blot turned on its side. Few districts have quite so an extraordinary appearance.
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I, this one defied geographic description. Nevertheless, the court concluded the
Hispanic population was geographically compact.
FIGURE 8.
ILLINOIS 4TH CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT, 1991
In 1992, a federal court in Florida adopted the minority districts depicted
below on the theory that the new districts would "overall substantially
increase[] the level of political participation and electoral representation for
members of minority groups in Florida. 84 In adopting these districts, the Court
stated:
[T]he proper focus of any geographic compactness analysis is
on the size and relative concentration of the minority
population, rather than upon the size or shape of the district.
Additionally, although respecting traditional county
boundaries is a desirable approach, this aesthetic requirement
should not undercut the primary goal of creating minority
85
84. DeGrandy v. Wetherell, 794 F. Supp. 1076, 1088 (N.D. Fla. 1992).
85. Id. at 1085.
[Vol. 57: 749
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FIGURE 9.
FLORIDA 3RD CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT, 1992
FIGURE 10.
FLORIDA 23RD CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT, 1992
I - r -
N ! - r-
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The DOJ's Section 5 demands undoubtably exceeded the impact the courts
had on traditional districting standards under the guise of complying with
Section 2. The minority districts depicted in Part II are representative of those
the DOJ routinely extracted from Section 5 jurisdictions at all levels as the
price of preclearance.
IV. DESPITE THE COURT'S RULING IN SHAW V. RENO AND RELATED CASES,
DISTRICTS CREATED IN VIOLATION OF TRADITIONAL DISTRICTING
STANDARDS STILL DOMINATE IN MANY SECTION 5 JURISDICTIONS
As briefly discussed earlier, although private citizens successfully
challenged many of the districts distorted to obtain Section 5 preclearance, and
despite the safe harbor from federal litigation that legislators might have
secured by following traditional districting standards,86 very few of the
challenged districts were redrawn in a manner that comported with traditional
districting standards. Moreover, the distorted districts actually challenged were
likely only a small sample of those created during the 1990s. The redistrictings
after the 2000 census not only carried over the distorted districts from the
1990s, but additional distortions were added in many jurisdictions.
I suggest three primary explanations for the minimal impact of the Shaw
line of cases on restoring traditional districting standards. First, the Supreme
Court's basis for holding the districts unconstitutional only indirectly
implicated their gross deviation from traditional districting standards. Second,
while the Court's Shaw line of cases seemingly foreclosed the direct use of race
to construct districts, in a back-handed manner they legitimized
gerrymandering for any other reason. Third, in most cases, elections had been
held under the plans containing the challenged districts and political forces had
come to rest, so to speak. Newly elected legislators were not anxious to redraw
the challenged districts in a manner that would require substantial changes in
their own districts.
A. Shaw and Progeny: Good News, Bad News for Sensible Districts
The possible good news of the Shaw line of cases was that legislators could
no longer be compelled by legal or political forces to create majority-minority
districts if those districts could only be created by significant deviations from
86. In Bush v. Vera, a challenge to the Texas districts depicted above, Justice O'Connor noted:
Under our cases, the States retain a flexibility that federal courts enforcing § 2
lack, both insofar as they may avoid strict scrutiny altogether by respecting their
own traditional districting principles .... And nothing that we say today should
be read as limiting 'a State's discretion to apply traditional districting principles'
in majority-minority, as in other, districts.
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traditional districting standards.8 7 The bad news for sensible districts was that
these cases had no impact on the legitimacy of bizarre districts created for non-
racial reasons. While the Supreme Court resoundingly rejected the underlying
rationale for these districts having been created-namely to comply with either
Section 5 or Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act-the key to their
unconstitutionality was solely that they were racial gerrymanders. The district
lines were driven by racial concerns, triggering strict scrutiny. The states failed
to put forth a compelling state interest that could justify the use of race as the
primary basis to assign citizens to election districts, at least not if the resulting
districts violated traditional districting standards. The Court in Shaw
emphasized that traditional districting standards (other than one person, one
vote) were not mandated by the Constitution.88
The critical point for the future of sensible districts was that to trigger strict
scrutiny, the challenger must demonstrate that race, rather than politics, drove
the legislature's districting choices. Writing for the majority in the last of the
Shaw progeny cases, Justice Breyer summarized the challenger's burden as
follows:
The Court has specified that those who claim that a legislature
has improperly used race as a criterion, in order, for example,
to create a majority-minority district, must show at a minimum
that the "legislature subordinated traditional race-neutral
districting principles ... to racial considerations." Race must
not simply have been "a motivation for the drawing of
amajority-minority district," but "the 'predominant factor'
motivating the legislature's districting decision[J" Plaintiffs
must show that a facially neutral law "'is "unexplainable on
grounds other than race .... 
89
Challengers in Shaw's progeny cases had experienced little difficulty
satisfying this standard because legislators and others promoting these districts
basically had convinced lawmakers and the public that the Voting Rights Act
required the creation of majority-minority districts by any means available.
Once legislators were educated, however, challengers would have more
difficulty demonstrating that race was "the 'predominant factor' motivating the
legislature's districting decision." 90 In Easley v. Cromartie,91 the Court
87. It should be noted that Shaw does not hamper legislators' ability to create majority-minority
districts that comply with traditional districting standards even if they intentionally elevate one standard
above another for that purpose (e.g., electing to accommodate a community of interest rather than
following political subdivisions' boundaries).
88. See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647 (1993).
89. Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 241-42 (2001) (citations omitted) (ellipsis in original)
(quoting Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 546, 547 (1999); Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 959 (1996)).
90. Id. at 241.
91. 532 U.S. 234 (2001).
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reviewed North Carolina's post-1990 congressional districts for the fourth time.
This time, however, the legislature had produced the plan with full knowledge
that it was limited in the use it could make of race. The Court, by a five to four
vote, reversed the lower court's determination that race, rather than politics,
had been the predominate factor in revising (very modestly revising, it should
be noted) the state's invalidated 12th Congressional District.92
Thus, the end result of the Court's eight affirmative racial gerrymandering
decisions was that legislators could continue to create majority-minority
districts without complying with traditional districting standards, so long as
they provided credible political, rather than racial, reasons for their non-
conformance. Far more significantly than the means Cromartie provided to
evade charges of race-based districting was the Court's emphasis that
gerrymandering for purely political purposes-including to advance partisan
agendas or to protect incumbents, no matter how bizarre the districts-did not
trigger strict scrutiny. Anyone challenging bizarre districts on grounds other
than race would have the burden of establishing not only political
gerrymandering (a discriminatory intent) but also partisan dilution (a
discriminatory impact).
93
As critics of the Court's Shaw line of cases pointed out, some white
majority districts, like those below, were equally distorted for nonracial reasons
but were not subject to strict scrutiny and thus were likely to survive a
constitutional challenge. 94
92. Id. at 243.
93. In Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986), the Court held political gerrymandering presented
a justiciable issue. Id. at 127. The challengers could establish an Equal Protection claim if they were
able to show that a districting plan had been adopted with the intent to discriminate against an
identifiable political group, and that the plan actually had a discriminatory effect on the group. Id.
However, the Court's standard set a seemingly impossible burden to establish discriminatory impact
("the electoral system is arranged in a manner that will consistently degrade a voter's or a group of
voters' influence on the political process as a whole"). Id. at 132. Political gerrymandering was before
the Court again in Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004). In Vieth, the Supreme Court affirmed the
decision of the three-judge district court, finding insufficient evidence of a discriminatory impact to
support a partisan gerrymandering claim. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 305-06. Four of the Justices (Rehnquist,
Scalia, O'Connor, and Thomas) concluded that political gerrymandering claims were non-justiciable.
Id. at 281. Justice Kennedy (who provided the fifth vote for affirmation) disagreed. Id. at 306-17
(Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy agreed that no acceptable standards assessing partisan
gerrymandering claims under the Constitution had been proposed by the four dissenting Justices,
however, he remained open to the possibility that standards might someday be devised to adjudicate
claims of extreme partisan gerrymandering. Id. at 316-17.
94. See Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 1003-04 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 57: 749
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FIGURE 11.
MAJORITY-WHITE TEXAS CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS
LEFr UNCHALLENGED IN BUSH V. VERA (SCALE VARIES)9 5
In most circumstances, districts such as those above were a by-product of
having created majority-minority districts, which could not be created by
following traditional districting standards. 96 "But for" the majority-minority
districts, legislators generally would not have needed to resort to extreme
95. Maps courtesy of Mark Monmonier, Professor of Geography, Maxwell School of Citizenship
and Public Affairs, Syracuse University.
96. Majority-white Texas Districts 3 and 25, for example, were distorted in part because they were
adjacent to a contorted minority district. Id. at 1019 n.18. The ripple effect of the three distorted
minority districts on others was evidenced in part by the fact that when the lower court redrew those
districts, it also had to redraw portions of ten other districts (including the three majority white districts
depicted above). Of course, it is possible that compact minority districts could have been produced, but
not without undermining the reelection of certain Democratic incumbents-which essentially was the
argument Texas made on appeal. Indeed, credible arguments were made by Justice Stevens, dissenting
in Bush v. Vera, as well as by commentators, that protecting Democratic incumbents, rather than racial
concerns, produced Texas's distorted districts (which, had these arguments prevailed, would have
avoided the application of strict scrutiny). See id. at 1004; Ely, supra note 79, at 613. The district court
acknowledged that Texas's redistricting plan as a whole was a substantial partisan gerrymander:
It is important to realize that as enacted in Texas in 1991, many incumbent
protection boundaries sabotaged traditional redistricting principles as they
routinely divided counties, cities, neighborhoods, and regions. For the sake of
maintaining or winning seats in the House of Representatives, Congressmen or
would-be Congressmen shed hostile groups and potential opponents by fencing
them out of their districts. The Legislature obligingly carved out districts of
apparent supporters of incumbents, as suggested by the incumbents, and then
added appendages to connect their residences to those districts.
Vera v. Richards, 861 F. Supp. 1304, 1334 (S.D.Tex. 1994) (citations omitted). Nevertheless, the Court
agreed with the lower court's conclusion that the districts were unconstitutional racial gerrymanders,
finding "ample bases on which to conclude both that racially motivated gerrymandering had a
qualitatively greater influence on the drawing of district lines than politically motivated
gerrymandering, [which was itself] ... accomplished in large part by the use of race as a proxy." Bush
v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 969 (1996).
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gerrymandering to further other interests. 97 The critics are correct, however, in
noting the irony of invalidating bizarre minority districts while leaving
untouched bizarre districts created for other reasons. A race-based district often
would satisfy one basis for a sensible district-namely that its inhabitants (at
least that portion of its inhabitants for which it was created) have sufficient
common political interests to be represented effectively by the district's
legislator.
B. The Politics of Distorted Districts
One might believe that after Shaw seemingly lessened the ability of the
DOJ and others to extract gerrymandering under the Voting Rights Act, states
would return to their traditional districting standards. A casual perusal of the
congressional and legislative districts in the Section 5 states-most of which
can be viewed online-should convince the reader otherwise.98 I suggest the
explanation for continued, perhaps even greater, deviation from traditional
districting standards is a combination of "politics," "politics with compassion,"
and "politics with a vengeance."
1. Politics
All of a jurisdiction's districts are connected to some degree. The
geographic distortions necessary to create minority districts or to help
incumbents displaced by those districts necessarily rippled though a state's
entire districting plan, indirectly producing additional "non-standard" districts.
The only distorted districts required to be redrawn by Shaw-type cases were
those in which the distortions were primarily attributable to racial sorting. The
only remedy required was to redraw the race-based districts without an
impermissible reliance on race. 99
97. Democrats controlled the post-1990 redistricting in North Carolina, Georgia, and Texas.
Partisan make-up of legislative houses and congressional delegations is available online: FairVote,
North Carolina Redistricting 2000, http://www.fairvote.org/?page=323; FairVote, Georgia Redistricting
2000, http://www.fairvote.org/?page=300; and FairVote, Texas Redistricting 2000,
http://www.fairvote.orgl?page=333. Had these legislators not been under legal and political pressure
to create minority districts, they surely would have been able to preserve their reelection opportunities,
as they had in the past, with minimal deviations from traditional districting principles.
98. Maps of these districts can be accessed via the Department of the Interior's National Atlas of
the United States website, located at http://www.nationalatlas.gov. Various state legislative district maps
can also be located online: Alabama, http://www.legislature.state.al.us; Arizona,
http://www.azredistricting.org; Georgia, http://www.georgiareapportionment.uga.edu; Louisiana,




99. See, e.g., Vera v. Bush, 933 F. Supp. 1341 (S.D. Tex. 1996) (the Texas racial gerrymandering
case on remand). In deference to the legislature, the district court's remedial plan was limited to revising
the districts found to be unconstitutional racial gerrymanders and those districts whose boundaries were
[Vol. 57: 749
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In most cases, elections had been held in the race-based districts before
they were ruled unconstitutional. Those elected no doubt believed the
boundaries of their districts, even if distorted, were just fine. When legislators
eventually produced remedial districts, they would be inclined to make as few
modifications to the invalid ones as possible to lessen the ripple effect on the
remaining districts.' 0 Thus, the natural self-preservation instincts of
incumbents would result in redrawn districts changing only enough to remedy
the racial gerrymandering. Indeed, they may simply have followed the example
set by North Carolina, which substituted "political data" for "racial data," to
convert its racially gerrymandered 12th Congressional District into an
unassailable Democratic gerrymander, with little increase in its compliance
with traditional districting standards.'
2. Politics with Compassion (Maybe)
Notwithstanding the means by which they got there, minority incumbents
enjoyed the consideration legislators often afforded their own members. Even
in an era of seemingly virulent partisanship, particularly in redistricting,
minority incumbents, including very junior ones, got "byes" from both
parties. 0 2 Some legislators were undoubtably motivated by compassion for the
new incumbents and others by a genuine belief in the importance of diversity
in the legislative body and still others by the perception that, in an era of
political correctness, failure to affirmatively support the retention of minority
necessarily affected. Id. at 1342. Roughly a third of all voters in Texas lived in an affected district,
which was "an inevitable consequence of the magnitude and brazenness of the gerrymandering in which
the Legislature engaged." Id. at 1349. The district court recognized that there were other distorted
districts, but indicated it had "no remedial mandate so broad as to address any other districts aside from
those found unconstitutional." Id. at 1352 n.16. But see Johnson v. Miller, 922 F. Supp. 1556, 1560-61
(S.D. Ga. 1995), aff d sub nom., Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74 (1997) (concluding the court was not
bound by the usual rule of deference to legislative policy when drawing a remedial plan because the
districting plan at issue was not the product of true legislative intent but rather of improper DOJ coercion).
100. Unlike a federal court, whose "redrawing" of election districts is limited to remedying the
constitutional violation, the legislature would be free to produce an entirely new plan, unless there were
state law restrictions on its redistricting powers.
101. The state redrew the district using as building blocks precincts that had voted
overwhelmingly for Democratic candidates, which to no one's surprise were also heavily black
precincts. The revised district, which was only slightly less bizarre than its predecessor, can be viewed
on line. North Carolina General Assembly, Information Systems Division, North Carolina
Congressional Districts-Percent Above and Below Ideal Population (April 3, 2002),
http://www.ncga.state.nc.us/Redistricting/Archives/ThematicMaps/Ideal-Population/CongressIde
al.pdf.
102. When North Carolina redrew the 12th Congressional District, part of its "political
explanation" for making virtually no changes in the district was to protect its incumbent, Democrat Mel
Watts, an African American. Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 247-48 (2001). The state alleged that
pitting Watts against a Republican incumbent would have been the unavoidable result of adopting a
more "standard" district. Id. Similarly, when the new Republican majority in Georgia's legislature
redrew the state's congressional districts in 2005, it appears to have preserved the reelection
opportunities of the state's four African American congressmen (all Democrats).
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districts carried certain political risks. Moreover, Shaw notwithstanding,
covered jurisdictions still had to comply with Section 5's non-retrogression
standard and all jurisdictions had to guard against Section 2 liability. Because
of increased geographic dispersion of African Americans by 2000, retaining the
number of majority, or near-majority black districts that had been added during
the 1990s would be difficult without further erosion of districting standards.
3. Politics with a Vengeance
Before Shaw, Republicans used the Voting Rights Act to insist upon the
creation of additional minority districts (seldom conceding the political benefits
they expected to reap from "bleached" districts left behind). Democrats used
the Voting Rights Act's "requirement" that those districts be created as an
explanation for why so many of the state's districting standards had been
ignored (seldom conceding that some portion of the geographic distortion in the
post-1990s districts was motivated by their desire to be reelected). After Shaw
and its companion cases made clear that traditional districting standards were
not mandated by the constitution and that gerrymandering for nonracial reasons
did not trigger usually fatal strict scrutiny, the parties had less need to "rely"
on the Voting Rights Act to cover up partisan agendas.
When it was time to redistrict again following the 2000 Census, many
legislators had been elected in geographically distorted districts to which they
were understandably attached. Once legislators were hooked on the personal
and partisan advantages of districts drawn without regard to traditional
districting standards, it was easy to draw more districts with even less regard
for standards. As three distinguished voting rights scholars recently noted:
In earlier decades, respect for these principles imposed tacit
constraints on the extent to which self-interested redistricters
could manipulate district design to insulate preferred
incumbents and candidates from political competition and
electoral accountability. As with other tacit constraints, once
these informal, generally accepted limitations on unmediated
pursuit of political self-interest begin to break down, a race to
the bottom quickly ensures the virtual elimination of these
traditional constraints altogether. 103
103. Brief of Samuel Issacharoff, Burt Neubome, and Richard H. Pildes as Amici Curiae in
Support of Appellants 26, League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, No. 05-204; Travis County
v. Perry, No. 05-254; Eddie Jackson v. Perry, No. 05-276; GI Forum of Texas v. Perry, No. 05-439
(U.S. Jan. 10, 2006).
[Vol. 57: 749
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Georgia's 2000 redistricting plans provide an example of the Democratic
strategy after Shaw. Democrats controlled the state legislature at the time."° On
an almost strict party-line vote, the legislature passed a plan for the state senate
that maintained the number of districts with majority black voting age
populations and also accomplished its sponsors' expressed purpose to increase
the number of Democrats in the Senate.'0 5 The DOJ refused to preclear three of
the districts because the plan "retrogressed from the 1992 plan."'0 6 Georgia was
unsuccessful in overturning the objection in the district court.'0 7 However, the
Supreme Court reversed, thus rejecting the DOJ's position and, in the process,
adopted a highly subjective definition of when a districting plan is
"retrogressive."' 10 8 Without going into detail, the Court's new definition of
retrogression allowed the state to place greater reliance on the presence of
minority "influence" and "coalitional" districts, as well as on "the comparative
position of legislative leadership, influence, and power for representatives of
the [existing] majority-minority districts" to maintain the minority group's
ability to participate in the political process.0 9
Picking the most grossly distorted districts created following the 2000
census would be difficult. However, the congressional districts that Georgia's
Democrats adopted in 2002 would have to be in the running. The districts were
so distorted that the representation of the state-wide plan provided below does
not fully reveal the degree to which it violates traditional districting
standards. "0 The most bizarre district is the 13th Congressional District, a new
104. See FairVote, Georgia Redistricting 2000, http://www.fairvote.org/?page=300 (providing
breakdown of partisan composition of the Georgia Legislature in 1991 and 2001). Democrats were still
in control but clearly had lost ground. The state was unable to produce a new congressional districting
plan after its 1992 plan was thrown out in Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995) (one of the Shaw
progeny cases), and thus congressional elections in 1996, 1998, and 2000 were held under a court-
drawn plan. Abrams, 521 U.S. at 78. Whether it was because of the new districts or simply because of
changing voter sentiment, Democrats went from holding nine congressional seats out of ten in 1991
(under the 1980 apportionment) to only three of eleven in 2001. FairVote, Georgia Redistricting 2000,
http://www.fairvote.org/?page=300. The three Democrats were black and the eight Republicans were
white. Kevin Sack, Democrats Face Facts of Redrawing Georgia, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 2001, at A14.
Democrats faired better in the legislative districts they had drawn themselves. They dropped from 45
to 32 seats of a total of 56 in the senate and from 145 to 105 seats in the house of a total of 180.
FairVote, Georgia Redistricting 2000, http://www.fairvote.org/?page=300.
105. Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461,469-70 (2003).
106. Id. at 467.
107. Id. at 468.
108. Id. at 479-85, 491.
109. Id. at 483.
110. For a map of Georgia's districts after the 2002 redistricting, visit
http://nationalatlas.gov/printable/images/pdf/congdist/pagecgd 109ga2.pdf. The Democrats' Supreme
Court victory in Georgia v. Ashcroft brought them only a temporary reprieve from the looming presence
of a statewide Republican electoral majority. The Supreme Court remanded the case for reconsideration
in light of its announced standard. Id. at 491. Meanwhile, back in federal court in Georgia, Republicans
successfully challenged the modified plan the state adopted to obtain Section 5 preclearance as a
violation of one person, one vote. See Larios v. Cox, 300 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 1356 (N.D. Ga. 2004).
When the legislature failed to produce a new plan, the 2004 elections were held under a plan drawn by
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heavily Democratic district created by stringing together pockets of black
population and other Democratic strongholds from the suburbs surrounding
Atlanta.
FIGURE 12.
GEORGIA CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS IN 2002,
EMPHASIZING THE 13TH DISTRICT
the court. Republicans gained control of both houses of the legislature in 2004 and thereafter redrew
the congressional districts. The new districts are slightly less geographically distorted (and probably
even more favorable to election of Republicans) than the 2002 districts, but still nowhere close to the
compact congressional districts of the past composed of entire counties. The new map divides only
eighteen counties compared to the prior 2002 plan, which divided thirty-four. However, the 1980 plan
divided only three counties (one of which, Fulton, was too large to be contained within a single district).
[Vol. 57:749
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It is reasonable to assume that Georgia was not alone in its seemingly
voluntary abandonment of districting standards. Today, in jurisdictions subject
to Section 5, election districts at all levels of government are highly irregular.
Mississippi's state legislative districts may take the prize for the most
distorted-distortion that cannot be appreciated in black and white. The
districts can be found in color online.'
V. THE FUTURE OF GEOGRAPHIC REPRESENTATION
Where do grossly distorted districts leave grass roots political activity?
Where do they leave would-be challengers? Of course, not everyone agrees that
distorted districts-at least majority-minority ones-are grossly
"dysfunctional.""' 2 However, arguments that distorted districts do not disrupt
grassroots political activity are a hard sell. Most political groups are organized
on the basis of geography-counties, municipalities, neighborhoods. Districts
that cut across recognized areas make the efforts of these groups more difficult
to coordinate-particularly if they are aimed at the incumbent. Challengers
have difficulty locating their potential supporters and finding opportunities to
personally address political and civic groups about issues of the district-not
to mention figuring out what issues might be of common concern to people in
the district, whose primary commonality may have been support of the
incumbent's party in past elections.
Assuming these districts are non-functional in a representational system
based on geography, what is the solution? One solution is to adopt a different
system, one that provides all voters with genuine interest group representation
rather than the artificial version currently provided to minority groups and the
highly partisan by extreme gerrymandering. Proportional representation
systems come in numerous variations and (thankfully) are beyond the scope of
this article." 3 Unlike winner-take-all systems, these systems provide a much
closer match between the votes cast for various political parties and the make
up of the legislative body. Whether this feature of proportional representation
is a sufficient basis to prefer it over geographically based representation is
highly debatable. What is not debatable, however, is that proportional
representation would be a drastic change in the method of representation in
111. Mississippi's state legislative districts can be viewed at http://www.msjrc.state.ms.us.
112. See MONMONIER, supra note 7, at 154 (arguing North Carolina's interstate district and some
of the intricate inner city districts, such as Chicago's 4th Congressional District approved in Hastert v.
State Bd. of Elections, 777 F. Supp. 634 (N.D. Ill 1991), are more functional than their critics suggest).
113. Recognizing the limitations of single member districts as a means to guarantee "fair"
minority representation, many voting rights advocates prefer one of the semiproportional representation
systems, such as cumulative voting, limited voting, or a "single transferable vote" system. See, e.g.,
Lani Guinier, The Triumph of Tokenism: The Voting Rights Act and the Theory of Black Electoral
Success, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1077 (1991) (paren); Judith Reed, Of Boroughs, Boundaries and
Bullwinkles: The Limitations of Single-Member Districts in a Multiracial Context, 19 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 759 (1992) (paren); Richard Engstrom, The Single Transferable Vote: An Alternative Remedy for
Minority Vote Dilution, 27 U.S.F. L. REV. 781 (1997) (paren).
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place since the founding of the nation for Congress, state legislatures, and most
local governing bodies. Such a change should not be imposed on any
jurisdiction's citizens without their consent.' 1
4
What are the prospects for restoring sensible geographic districts? The
Supreme Court is considering another political gerrymandering case this Term,
but nothing in its prior decisions suggests an inclination to find that citizens
have a constitutional right to non-bizarre election districts. 1 5 Even if the Court
concludes standards can be devised for partisan gerrymandering, there is no
guarantee that more sensible districts will then emerge. Indeed, so long as
Gaffney v. Cummings"6 remains good law, the "remedy" for partisan
gerrymandering might be to gerrymander more to produce partisan balance.
At this point, if relief is to be available for the "outs, '... it may be hard to
find. Perhaps state courts can be persuaded to take seriously state constitutional
or statutory requirements for the creation of districts-when they exist.' It
seems highly unlikely that legislators elected from distorted districts will see
any value in change, particularly if they appreciate the difficulty facing those
who would challenge them for their seats.
114. Perhaps similar logic could serve as a basis to challenge the constitutionality of any
purported "district" that bears no resemblance to what passed for an acceptable district prior to 1990.
Drawing lines around a sufficient population to satisfy one person, one vote and giving the enclosed
area a number should not a district make.
115. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, No. 05-204 (argued Mar. 1, 2006) (the Texas
Republican gerrymander of Tom Delay fame). Given that Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004),
placed partisan gerrymandering claims on life-support, there has been much speculation as why the
Court agreed to hear another case so soon.
116. 412 U.S. 735 (1973) (finding constitutional a districting plan "gerrymandered" to produce
districts-many of which violated the state's traditional districting plan-that would result in a
legislature that mirrored the popular vote).
117. Here I include among the "outs" that large segment of the electorate that is not highly
partisan and thus is likely to vote for an individual candidate with modest or no regard for party, as well
as would-be challengers to incumbents.
118. South Carolina's Constitution, as well as those of many other states, mandates a formal
connection between counties and members of the legislature. See S.C. CONST. art. III, §§ 3, 6. Of
course, this connection cannot be recognized when it violates federal law, thus precluding a return to
county-based representation. One could argue, however, that a state's constitutional provisions must
be followed except to the extent necessary to comply with federal law, thus providing a basis to
challenge certain offending districts in state court.
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